Fluton is on mainnet with CoFHE under the hood, with the Fluton site shown on a laptop

Your DeFi, your privacy: Fluton is on mainnet, with CoFHE under the hood

Modified:
19 November 2026
Published:
19 November 2026

Fluton is a privacy pool for existing wallets. You shield tokens into it, pay other people inside it without the amount, recipient or token appearing on-chain, and pay out to any address when you want to leave. It launched on Arbitrum mainnet on 18 November 2026. Under the hood, the pool's reserves are Fhenix fhERC20 balances, and every deposit and payout is confirmed by the Fhenix CoFHE coprocessor before the pool treats it as real.

This article explains what Fluton does, how a private payment moves through it, and exactly which parts are handled by fully homomorphic encryption, which by zero-knowledge proofs, and what stays visible to whom.

What Fluton does

Private DeFi on Arbitrum now has a product you can open with the wallet you already use. Fluton does three things:

  1. Shield. Move USDC or ETH from your public wallet into the pool. The deposit is public. Everything after it is not.
  2. Pay privately. Send any amount to a shielded address. The chain records three commitments and three ciphertexts of identical size. It does not record the amount, the recipient or the token.
  3. Pay out. Withdraw to your own wallet, or pay a 0x address or ENS name directly. A relayer can submit the transaction and pay the gas, so the wallet that funded the payment never appears.

There is no new chain, no new token to hold, and no backup file. One signature from your wallet derives your shielded wallet, and the same signature recreates it on any device.

How a private payment works on Fluton

Inside the pool, value is not held as account balances. It is held as notes: small records of an amount, an owner key, a random blinding value and an asset. Each note appears on-chain only as a commitment, a hash that reveals none of those fields.

A payment spends one or two of your notes and creates three new ones: one for the recipient, one for your change, and one for the relayer's fee. A zero-knowledge proof, generated in your browser, shows that you owned the inputs, that you have not spent them before, and that the inputs equal the outputs. The pool verifies the proof and adds the new commitments to its tree.

The recipient does not need gas, an account, or any prior on-chain history. Their wallet scans the pool's ciphertexts, trial-decrypts each one with their key, and rebuilds their balance from what opens. Fluton's docs describe this as scanning doubling as recovery: one key and the chain are enough to recover every note you own.

Where CoFHE sits: encrypted balances the pool can still verify

Here is the part most privacy pools skip. A pool has reserves. If those reserves are plain ERC-20 balances, anyone can read the pool's total and watch it change with every deposit and withdrawal, which leaks the very amounts the pool is supposed to hide.

Fluton does not hold plain ERC-20 reserves. Each listed asset sits in a Fhenix fhERC20 wrapper (eUSDC, eWETH) whose balances are ciphertexts. Reserves, open deposit receipts and unsettled payouts are all encrypted state. The CoFHE coprocessor performs arithmetic on those ciphertexts and signs the results of any decryption the contract requests.

That raises a problem Fluton had to solve. An fhERC20 transfer that exceeds the sender's balance does not revert. It moves zero and returns an encrypted amount. A successful transaction receipt therefore proves nothing about how much value moved. So the pool never trusts a receipt. On an encrypted deposit, it records what arrived as a ciphertext plus an encrypted flag for received equals requested, then waits for CoFHE's signed decryption of that flag before it credits any notes. On a payout, it does the same in reverse: an encrypted sent equals requested bit, confirmed by CoFHE, before the obligation is marked settled. If the bit says no, the pool retries only the encrypted remainder.

The result is a pool that can prove it is solvent without showing its books. Anyone can call checkBacking on an asset. The contract sums four liability terms, two public and two encrypted, compares the sum to its encrypted fhERC20 balance under encryption, and publishes a single decryptable answer. A monitor learns that the pool is backed. It does not learn by how much, or what any individual holds.

Where zero-knowledge proofs sit: hiding history, not values

FHE and ZK solve different problems, and Fluton's architecture page is explicit about the split. FHE hides values the contract must still compute on. Zero-knowledge proofs hide the link between an action and the history behind it.

The proofs are Groth16 over Circom circuits, with a trusted setup ceremony of 222 contributors and a public transcript. All listed tokens share one Merkle tree, one nullifier set and one anonymity set. Because a transfer names no token, every new note joins the anonymity set of every listed asset at once. A payment of 50 USDC and a payment of 3 ETH look identical on-chain, down to the 168-byte ciphertexts.

What stays public, and who can see what

Fluton does not claim that nothing is visible. Its privacy model page lists, per operation, what is public and to whom. The short version:

  • Deposit: your wallet, the amount, the token and the format are public. Crossing the pool boundary is a public act.
  • Private transfer: the commitments, ciphertexts and nullifiers are public. The amount, recipient and token are not. If you submit the transaction yourself, your wallet is the public sender; through a relayer, the relayer is.
  • Withdrawal or payout: the amount, token and recipient are public. The funding deposit is not linked to them.
  • View keys: you can hand an auditor or accountant a read-only key that shows your balances and history and cannot spend. This is the same need-to-know model Fhenix uses with permits: confidential by default, disclosed by the owner's choice.

Fluton also publishes its limits. A relayed token hides only among the tokens that relayer serves. Deposit screening (every deposit carries a signed check of the depositing address) runs at entry only. The pool is upgradeable by its admin key. These are stated in the docs, which is more than most privacy products offer.

Why Fluton built on Fhenix

Three properties of CoFHE show up directly in Fluton's design.

It runs where the liquidity is. CoFHE has been live on Ethereum and Arbitrum since 21 October 2026. Fluton's pool is a set of ordinary contracts on Arbitrum that call the coprocessor. No new chain, no bridge for users.

The contract can act on what it cannot see. The deposit and payout checks above only work because a contract can hold a ciphertext, ask for an encrypted comparison, and receive a signed decryption of one bit. That is the fhERC20 and permit model, used for its intended purpose.

Selective disclosure is built in. Fluton's view keys and Fhenix's permits answer the same question from institutions: confidentiality that a compliance team can still audit, rather than anonymity that nobody can.

Fhenix lists Fluton as the top featured app in its ecosystem, under privacy middleware: privacy infrastructure for existing wallets and dApps. Fluton's roadmap extends the same pool into encrypted intents, cross-chain swaps and DeFi adapters.

How to try it

Open app.fluton.io on Arbitrum with any injected wallet. Sign once to derive your shielded wallet, and a second time to allow CoFHE to decrypt your own encrypted balance for display. Shield a small amount, send it to your own shielded address to see a private transfer land, then unshield to a fresh wallet to see the payout arrive with no link to the deposit. Deposits are free; withdrawals pay a 0.35% pool fee plus the relayer's gas quote.

The full architecture, the privacy model and the contract reference are at docs.fluton.io. You can learn more about the fhERC20 standard and CoFHE from our documentation.

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